The new politics of global tax governance: taking stock a decade after the financial crisis

Rasmus Corlin Christensen & Martin Hearson (2019). The new politics of global tax governance: taking stock a decade after the financial crisis, Review of International Political Economy, 26:5, 1068-1088

As the new academic year gets underway, it’s time for me to promote a review piece that Rasmus Christensen and I published over the summer. We provide a framing of current developments in global tax governance from a political economy perspective. The piece is written at introductory level and fills the gap for an overview reading in university courses. It is framed as a review of four interdisciplinary books, all of which we recommend. Oh and it’s open access, thanks to EU funding!

Here’s the abstract:

The financial crisis of 2007–2009 is now broadly recognised as a once-in-a-generation inflection point in the history of global economic governance. It has also prompted a reconsideration of established paradigms in international political economy (IPE) scholarship. Developments in global tax governance open a window onto these ongoing changes, and in this essay we discuss four recent volumes on the topic drawn from IPE and beyond, arguing against an emphasis on institutional stability and analyses that consider taxation in isolation. In contrast, we identify unprecedented changes in tax cooperation that reflect a significant contemporary reconfiguration of the politics of global economic governance writ large. To develop these arguments, we discuss the links between global tax governance and four fundamental changes underway in IPE: the return of the state through more activist policies; the global power shift towards large emerging markets; the politics of austerity and populism; and the digitalisation of the economy.

This table sets out the trends we identify, and our explanation of how they are affecting tax politics.

And here are the books we discuss:

Dietsch, P., & Rixen, T. (Eds). (2016). Global Tax Governance: What is wrong with it and how to fix it. Colchester: ECPR Press.

Fairfield, T. (2015). Private wealth and public revenue in Latin America: Business power and tax politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Harrington, B. (2016). Capital without borders: Wealth managers and the one percent. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Jogarajan, S. (2018). Double taxation and the league of nations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Transnational expertise and the expansion of the international tax regime

Hearson, M, 2018. Transnational expertise and the expansion of the international tax regime: imposing ‘acceptable’ standards. Review of International Political Economy 25(5):647-671.

We are living through a period of instability and change in the international tax regime, perhaps unprecedented in its depth and duration. It’s driven by economic and political changes, such as austerity politics, the digitisation of the economy, and the rise of China and other emerging powers. To understand the impact of these pressures on the institutions of tax cooperation, we need to know how the politics at international level works, and we have two complementary lenses to do so. One focuses on conflicts and alliances between states with different preferences: developed versus developing, offshore versus onshore, US versus Europe, and so on. The other takes a sociological approach, studying the transnational policy community that makes international tax rules and its interactions with other actors such as politicians and campaigners. To explain why the OECD, G20, EU or UN have reached a particular conclusion, we probably need to use both of these lenses.

But how do states arrive at their national positions? Those positions set the parameters for subsequent transnational discussions, but they also determine if and how states will implement international agreements. For example, with whom will they negotiate bilateral tax treaties, and on what terms? The same sociological lens is important here, because national tax policy is made by a community of people, many of whom are also involved in tax standard-setting at the OECD and elsewhere. At both national and international levels, international tax has historically been an obscure topic, the preserve of this small community of experts. Every so often – as in recent years – the community faces a conflict with others who aren’t steeped in the principles underlying the tax system, nor its technical details. Such conflicts can play out at the national level, as well as in the transnational sphere.

In an article published over the Christmas break, I explore this using archival documents that show how the UK formed its policy towards bilateral tax treaty negotiations with developing countries. I reach two important conclusions:

  1. Often it was the UK, rather than its developing country negotiating partner, that initiated and drove forward negotiations. The UK’s aim was to reduce the tax paid by British businesses abroad, making them more competitive in comparison to firms from other countries. So we can’t explain the expansion of the international tax regime into developing countries solely through a focus on developing countries’ actions.
  2. Tax experts, from the Inland Revenue and the business community, dominated policy formulation. They saw tax treaties as a means to lock developing countries into ‘acceptable’ OECD tax standards, a long game designed to protect British businesses from anything unconventional. Meanwhile, their non-expert counterparts in other government departments and businesses had different priorities derived from a focus on short-term tax gains. They were mostly unable to influence policy, however, indicating that business power over tax policy depends a lot on expertise.

I’ve uploaded all my photographs from the archive files that I cited into a zip file (warning: it’s very large: 660 pages and 273MB). Below is a selection to illustrate the argument.

First, Alan Lord, Deputy Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue, sets out the tax expert view in 1976:

Here is an extract from the minutes of a typical meeting between the Inland Revenue and tax professionals from British businesses. As can be seen, businesses are being consulted not just about which countries to negotiate with, but also about the sticking points in individual negotiations – in this case Malaysia.

Below is one of my favourite exchanges, from a few months later. In contrast to the open attitude to the CBI tax committee, the same Inland Revenue civil servant (Ann McNicol, now Ann Smallwood) refuses to share even a list of current negotiations with other departments.

Extract from a letter from Smallwood, Inland Revenue, to Harris, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1973. Click to see the whole document.

Smallwood’s letter provokes a round of very angry memos within those departments, of which this is a good example.

Extract from a memo by Kerr, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1973. Click to see the whole document.

A particular bone of contention between the two groups (Inland Revenue and the CBI tax committee on the one hand, Foreign Office, Departments of Trade and Industry, and their business interlocutors on the other) was the stalemate in negotiations with Brazil. In the paper I show how the tax experts in business and the Inland Revenue did not want to set what they saw as a bad precedent by caving in to Brazilian demands to sign a treaty that contravened OECD standards. They came under strong pressure to sign a treaty “at any price” from business lobbyists who thought UK firms were losing out to German and Japanese competitors that did benefit from treaties with Brazil. The consequence, as Smallwood put it in 1975, was that business “spoke with two voices”.

Extract from a memo by Smallwood, Inland Revenue, 1975. Click to see the whole document.

Ultimately, as the absence of a UK-Brazil treaty today underlines, it was the tax experts who won the day. This illustrates that, while businesses have certainly helped shape the design of the international tax regime, the corporate lobby is far from monolithic in its preferences and its ability to influence. A lobbying position stands more chance of success if it is coherent with the underlying design principles of the international tax regime, and articulated by members of the community of tax professionals at its heart. Whether this conclusion still holds in an era of politicisation and rapid change perhaps merits some further investigation…

The European Union’s tax treaties with developing countries: leading by example?

Yesterday a report I wrote for the European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) group in the European Parliament was published. It was used as input for a hearing of the Parliament’s TAX3 committee, at which Hannah Tranberg from ActionAid, Eric Mensah from the Ghana Revenue Authority and UN Tax Committee, and Sandra Gallina of DG Trade spoke. (This link is to a video of the hearing, which begins with Margaret Hodge and Tove Ryding discussing Brexit, then moves on to the tax treaties discussion at around 16:30).

When the GUE/NGL approached me about working with them on this report, I jumped at the chance. It uses the Tax Treaties Dataset, a project funded by ActionAid and launched in 2016. Earlier this year I had used much of the same analysis in a European Commission workshop for treaty negotiators, and the comparative element certainly caught some of their attention. Just last week I used the dataset at a workshop of African treaty negotiators organised by the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie, at which it helped them to begin the process of analysing their treaty networks and developing renegotiation strategies.

But the EU is partiuclarly important. Most of the world’s tax treaties – and 40% of those with developing countries – have an EU member as signatory. Combined with its commitment to policy coherence for development, this makes the EU uniquely placed to ‘lead by example’. Indeed, the European Parliament has already called for “Member States to properly ensure the fair treatment of developing countries when negotiating tax treaties, taking into account their particular situation and ensuring a fair distribution of taxation rights between source and residence.”


The report has two main messages, from my perspective. The first is that, while the recent attention paid to treaty shopping is most welcome, the basic balance between ‘source’ taxing rights – which allow countries to tax inward investment from the treaty partner – and ‘residence’ taxation in tax treaties with developing countries is also a problem.

The dataset, which includes over 500 tax treaties signed by developing countries, includes a measure how much of a developing country’s source taxing rights each treaty leaves intact. It turns out that EU treaties remove more source taxing rights than average, even when compared with other OECD members.



What’s more, the difference is growing.


Source/residence has been the elephant in the room in the debate over international tax rules in recent years, as we saw when it was dropped from the BEPS process at an early stage, only to re-emerge in the context of digital taxation. Countries conducting ‘spillover analysis’ or otherwise analysing their treaty networks need to take this into account.

The second message is that there’s a great deal of variety within and between countries’ treaty networks. There’s loads of variation within each EU Member’s treaties, and between the average values for EU members. The same is true when drilling down to individual provisions. So there is plenty of potential to ‘level up’ based on precedent


The report echoes the European Parliament in arguing that, if the EU wants to be a leader on policy coherence for development, Member States need to level up the source taxing rights across the different provisions of their treaties with developing countries. Simply saying that on balance their treaties are no worse than anyone else’s – a point the report questions when looking at the EU as a whole – is not enough. The four summary recommendations are for Member States to:

  1. Conduct spillover analyses incorporating reviews of their double taxation treaties, based on the principle of policy coherence for development and taking into account guidance from the European Commission and other bodies.
  2. Undertake a rolling plan of renegotiations with a focus on progressively increasing the source taxation rights permitted by EU members’ treaties.
  3. Reconsider their opposition to a stronger UN tax committee, as the Parliament has previously requested.
  4. Formulate and publish an EU Model Tax Convention for Development Policy Coherence, setting out source-based provisions that EU member states are willing to offer to developing countries as a starting point for negotiations, not in return for sacrifices on their part.

The Colombia UK tax treaty: 80 years in the making

Hearson, M, 2017. The UK-Colombia Tax Treaty: 80 Years in the Making. British Tax Review (4):375-384.

Today at 2.30pm, the UK parliament’s Third Delegated Legislation Committee will debate tax treaties with Lesotho and Colombia. It will be interesting to see how much debate really takes place, a matter on which I’ve commented before once or twice.

The hearing gives me a chance to plug my article in the British Tax Review last year [pdf], which traced the UK’s attempts to obtain a tax treaty with Colombia over 80 years. Its overtures were frequently rejected, at first because Colombia was not interested in tax treaties, then because it was bound by the terms of the Andean pact, and finally because it could not agree on terms with the UK, especially over technical service fees, an area where the UK position has changed. Since the article was published I had the chance to speak with a Colombian tax official, who told me that Colombia’s change of heart on technical service fees is a change of view about tax policy, rather than a concession forced by OECD membership, as I speculated in the article. Of course, the two developments might not be totally independent.

Here is how the article concludes:

The demands of OECD membership, combined with the unusually liberal use of MFN clauses during an era of less-than-strategic negotiation, seem to have backed a country once insistent on a “red line” over technical service fees, and before that sceptical of accepting the limitations on its taxing rights that come with a tax treaty, into a corner. Having been constrained in its negotiating position by the pro-source taxation stance of the Andean community, Colombia now finds itself pulled in the other direction by the OECD. Is this further proof that the world is moving inexorably towards an OECD-type tax system? The gradual but steady expansion of the OECD, given a fillip most recently by the announcement that Brazil would begin accession talks, might lead us to such a conclusion. In contrast, however, the continued expansion in the use of the technical service fees Article by developing countries, together with its imminent introduction into the UN Model Treaty, point towards a growing divide between states on this topic.

The long history of negotiations between the UK and Colombia perhaps demonstrates more than anything the extent to which the tax treatment of international transactions today is a product of historically specific events. Each side’s positions changed radically over time, from a refusal to accept each other’s terms to a willingness to concede them outright. The UK’s constant enthusiasm for a treaty with Colombia stands in contrast with the latter’s oscillation between hot and cold. If Colombia turns cold again, however, it will be left with a fossilised relic of its negotiating position in 2016. Given the rarity with which tax treaties are terminated or their terms substantially renegotiated, treaty networks are collections of these fossils. Hence Colombia is stuck with its MFN [most favoured nation] clauses, regrettable outcomes of its negotiating spree in the 2000s. The biggest irony, however, is reserved for the UK. Despite its apparent willingness in the 2000s to forgo a treaty with Colombia over withholding taxes on technical service fees, Britain retains, as a legacy of its negotiations from 1973 until the turn of the century, the largest number of treaties of any OECD Member containing just such a clause

Three new publications

Summer in academia is a time for tidying up, so I have updated the page of this site with my publications. Here are three recently published items, with links to downloadable versions and their abstracts:

The Journal of Development Studies

The challenges for developing countries in international tax justice (link is to PDF of accepted version)

This is a review article to appear in the Journal of Development Studies, which was published online in May.

Developing countries face three main challenges in international tax cooperation. The most widely known is the twin problems of tax avoidance by foreign investors and tax evasion by domestic actors, which have become a major focus of debate in international organisations and of civil society activism in recent years. The second problem, tax competition, incorporates a range of issues from the ‘prisoners’ dilemma’ facing countries competing for inward direct investment through to the harmful tax rules used by tax havens that enable tax avoidance and evasion. This article reviews four recent monographs that analyse these problems at an international level. While they contain much useful discussion of the problems and potential technical solutions, there remains a need for political economy research to understand why certain technical solutions have not been adopted by governments. A third challenge faced by developing countries, barely considered in the tax and development literature up to now, leads to a note of caution: international tax institutions tend to be designed in ways that place disproportionate restrictions on capital-importing countries’ ability to tax foreign investors.

Studies in the History of Tax Law, volume 8

The UK’s tax treaties with developing countries during the 1970s (link is to PDF of accepted version)

This is a chapter in Studies in the History of Tax Law, volume 8, edited by Peter Harris and Dominic De Cogan. It’s been published today by Hart Publishing.

Tax treaties between developed and developing countries impose considerable costs on the latter, in the form of curbs on their right to tax investment from the former. Existing research assumes that such restrictions are accepted as a quid pro quo for resolving the problem of double taxation, which might act as an obstacle to inward investment. This paper uses archival documents to examine treaty negotiations between the United Kingdom (UK) and developing countries during the 1970s, focusing on contentious provisions concerning ‘tax sparing’, the taxation of shipping, and withholding taxes. Consistent with critical literature on tax treaties, it finds that neither side was concerned about the double taxation problem, which was resolved unilaterally by the UK’s tax credit. Rather, developing countries were primarily focused on obtaining matching tax credits in the UK to maximise the benefits to investors from their tax incentives. UK priorities, meanwhile, were to bind developing countries into OECD-type tax treatment of British firms. Negotiated outcomes did not reflect the true balance of costs and benefits to each side, but their different negotiating capacities, the political salience of particular taxes, and the precedent certain concessions might set for future negotiations.

WIDER working paper front coverWhat makes countries negotiate away their corporate tax base? (link is to published pdf)

This is a working paper for the United Nations University World Institute for Development.

Qualitative case studies suggest that the outcomes of tax treaty negotiations are determined by power politics and negotiating capability. In contrast, quantitative studies have tended to depart from a model that implies absolute gains, full rationality, and perfect information on the part of both treaty signatories. This paper bridges the gap by replicating two existing quantitative studies, introducing new, more sophisticated data. New fiscal data are drawn from the ICTD Government Revenue Dataset, while treaty content is measured using the ActionAid Tax Treaties Dataset. It finds that developing countries that raise more corporate income tax are more likely to sign tax treaties with wealthier countries, and more likely to negotiate higher withholding tax rates in those treaties, but not more likely to obtain a better negotiated result overall. In contrast, developing countries that raise more revenue in total are more likely to negotiate better outcomes in other clauses of the treaty that are more obscure and technically complex. There is also a strong learning effect, with better outcomes across the board as a developing country gains experience of signing tax treaties. Finally, greater asymmetries in investment stocks and material capabilities lead to worse outcomes for developing countries.

Tax: an international political economy reading list

It’s been a while, but I’m back. One thing I did while the blog was silent was give a couple of lectures on tax and offshore, as part of broader courses I taught on international political economy and finance. In doing so I realised that the literature on international tax relations is not as sparse as it sometimes feels. Here is a selection of pieces that I included on my reading list for students. This should be a place to start if you’re a political scientist interested in learning about international tax, or from an economics or law background seeking different perspectives; if you’re from business, government or campaigning, see if these papers ring true to you. I have stuck strictly to publications in academic journals and academic books, but if you don’t have access to a university library, I’ve included links to any versions of the papers that are freely available.

This will be a living page, so please get in touch to point out anything I have missed, especially if you wrote it! The aim here is not to be comprehensive, but to provide an entry point. Apart from the law articles at the end, this is a disappointingly pale male list, and I hope over time to find some articles from a more diverse background!

Introductory articles

Gabriel Zucman, 2014. Taxing across Borders: Tracking Personal Wealth and Corporate Profits. Journal of Economic Perspectives 28(4): 121–148

The first piece on this list is actually by an economist. I like it because as well as bringing new data to the discussion about avoidance and evasion, it also explains the way the international tax system works pretty well and is a good entry level reading. I set it for my undergraduates in a general course on international political economy.

Thomas Rixen, 2011. From double tax avoidance to tax competition: Explaining the institutional trajectory of international tax governance. Review of International Political Economy 18(2): 197-227.

Rixen is probably the best known scholar writing on international tax in the rationalist, liberal institutionalist tradition, and this article encapsulates his powerful argument about path dependence in the development of the international tax regime: a system developed to tackle double taxation doesn’t have the institutional properties needed to handle harmful tax competition.

Jason Sharman, 2010. Offshore and the New International Political Economy. Review of International Political Economy 17(1): 1-19

This was a core reading for my postgraduate students, who enjoyed getting their teeth into it. The article sets out some of the main ways in which offshore is used in the global political economy – beyond just tax – organised around the concept of ‘calculated ambiguity’.

Ronen Palan, 1998. Trying to Have Your Cake and Eating It: How and Why the State System Has Created Offshore. International Studies Quarterly 2(4): 625–643

The oldest reading on the list, predating even the harmful tax practices project. It’s one of two articles by Ronen Palan that establish his concept of ‘commercialised sovereignty’, wrapping it up in an analysis of the political economy of the state under globalisation that helps explain why the state acts as it does. This was the other core reading for my postgraduates, because it explains the development of offshore within the evolution of the financial system more broadly.

Tax havens, coercion and information exchange

Lukas Hakelberg, 2016. Coercion in international tax cooperation: identifying the prerequisites for sanction threats by a great power. Review of International Political Economy 23(3): 511-541 

I came across Hakelberg’s work recently, and I think he does a great job of applying some classic rationalist international political economy theories to international tax. This article looks in particular at the nature of US financial hegemony in terms of internal and external factors, through the lens of the fight against tax havens.

Richard Eccleston and Richard Woodward, 2014. Pathologies in International Policy Transfer: The Case of the OECD Tax Transparency Initiative. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis 16(3): 216-229

OECD-bashing is a favourite hobby of international tax watchers, right through from NGO campaigners to the offshore industry. But those engaging in the practice rarely make their analysis of how the OECD works rigorous or explicit, whereas this paper tries to do so through the lens of bureaucratic politics.

Alex Cobham, Petr Janský and Markus Meinzer, 2015. The Financial Secrecy Index: Shedding new light on the geography of secrecy. Economic Geography 91(3): 281-303.

The financial secrecy index is a political intervention by Tax Justice Network, and as such it will always attract strong reactions. This is a peer-reviewed paper (the link is to a working paper version of the journal article) that sets it in context and explains the methodology. The discussion of defining ‘tax havens’ is essential background, and it would be a good exercise for students to review and critique the authors’ approach to developing the index.

Jason Sharman, 2012. Canaries in the Coal Mine: Tax Havens, the Decline of the West and the Rise of the Rest. New Political Economy, 17(4), pp.493-513

This is another good piece for students wanting to relate offshore to broader themes in international political economy. It divides offshore financial centres into five groups, and discusses how they have positioned themselves in the shifting terrain of the 21st century economy.

Michael C. Webb, 2004. Defining the Boundaries of Legitimate State Practice: Norms, Transnational Actors and the OECD’s Project on Harmful Tax Competition. Review of International Political Economy 11(4): 787-827

This article predates Jason Sharman’s definitive book on this topic. Its story, which considers the OECD as an organisation and the role played by particular interest groups, can very much be set in contrast to Lukas Hackelberg’s state-centred discussion.

Multinational corporate taxation

Leonard Seabrooke and Duncan Wigan, 2015. Powering ideas through expertise: professionals in global tax battles. Journal of European Public Policy 26(3): 357-374

In contrast to the rationalist, state-centred view of international tax bargaining employed by Rixen, Hackelberg and others, this article shifts focus to the role of professional expertise in propounding ideas. It also focuses on country-by-country reporting, which makes it one of the few articles so far to engage in depth with the campaigning around corporate tax avoidance.

Stephen Bell and Andrew Hindmoor, 2013. The Structural Power of Business and the Power of Ideas: The Strange Case of the Australian Mining Tax. New Political Economy 19(3): 470–486.

This paper questions whether the pressures created by tax competition are a real thing, arguing that it’s how much people believe capital will respond to tax competition that matters, not the extent to which it really will.

Philipp Genschel and Peter Schwarz, 2011. Tax competition: a literature review. Socio-economic Review 9(2): 339-370

I haven’t included a great deal of literature on tax competition in this list, because that’s a more familiar evidence base, but this is a great review that considers the political science and economics literature, as it was in 2011 at least.

Roland Paris, 2003. The Globalization of Taxation? Electronic Commerce and the Transformation of the State. International Studies Quarterly 47(2): 153–182

An old article that came to my attention when a student dug it out in an essay. Like Palan’s piece, also in ISQ, this paper draws out implications for the state from the challenges of globalisation and international taxation. It also has the merit that we can compare its speculation against what has happened since 2003.

Legal scholarship that crosses into international relations

Sol Picciotto, 2015. Indeterminacy, Complexity, Technocracy and the Reform of International Corporate Taxation. Social and Legal Studies 24(2): 165–184.

This article takes a Bourdieusian perspective on the relationship between power and expertise, providing a fresh view of the politics of international corporate tax. It makes a careful, compelling argument that can be read in parallel with Seabrooke and Wigan’s paper above.

Itai Grinberg, 2015. Breaking BEPS: The New International Tax Diplomacy. Georgetown law working paper.

Grinberg, like Lukas Hackelberg, is doing interesting work drawing analogies across from other, more intensively studied areas of international financial law, in particular the Basel process. This working paper is a great summary of where a research agenda based on this analogy might go.

Allison Christians, 2012. How Nations Share. Indiana Law Journal 87(4): 1407-1452.

This is my go-to piece analysing the trajectory of legalisation and judicialisation in international tax disputes. While work on the division of the tax base in international relations has tended to be preoccupied by the conclusion of tax treaties, this is one of the few pieces to examine how they are applied and used in practice.

Diane Ring, 2010. Who is Making International Tax Policy? International Organizations as Power Players in a High Stakes World. Fordham International Law Journal 33(3): 649-722

Diane Ring is probably the lawyer who has gone furthest into international relations literature. She uses it here to discuss institutional arrangements for international tax cooperation, focusing on the different actors involved and how they engage with each other.

Eduardo Baistrocchi, 2008. The Use and Interpretation of Tax Treaties in the Emerging World: Theory and Implications. British Tax Review 28(4):352-390.

Love it or hate it, game theory is a big part of international relations. These last two articles are good examples of legal scholars using it in their own work to examine the relationship between developed and developing countries in the international tax regime. This paper analyses how the structural characteristics of the international tax system shape incentives for developing countries to conclude and apply tax treaties.

Tsilly Dagan, 2000. The Tax Treaties Myth. New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 32:939-1175

This article has a kind of totemic status within the critical legal literature on tax treaties, and it’s the starting point for much of my own work. It all comes down to a bit of game theory that would not be out of place in an international relations article, which questions the prevailing logic behind tax treaties. While Baistrocchi, above, focuses on the system level, this paper concentrates on the bilateral relationship a developed and developing country.

Books and journal special issues

  • Revenue Mobilization in the Developing World: Changes, Challenges and Chances. 2016. Review of International Political Economy, 23(2).
  • Peter Dietsch, and Thomas Rixen (eds), 2016. Global Tax Governance : What is wrong with it and how to fix it. Colchester: ECPR Press.
  • Tasha Fairfield, 2015. Private wealth and public revenue in Latin America : business power and tax politics. New York: Cambridge University Press.
  • Jeremy Leaman and Attiya Waris, 2013. Tax Justice and the Political Economy of Global Capitalism, 1945 to the Present. New York: Berghahn
  • Ronen Palan, Richard Murphy and Christian Chavagneux, 2013. Tax havens: How globalization really works. Cornell University Press.
  • Richard Eccleston, 2012. The Dynamics of Global Economic Governance: The OECD, the Financial Crisis and the Politics of International Tax Cooperation. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
  • Thomas Rixen, 2008. The political economy of international tax governance. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
  • Reuven Avi-Yonah, 2007. International Tax as International Law. New York: Cambridge University Press.
  • Jason Sharman, 2006. Havens in a Storm: The Global Struggle for Tax Regulation. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
  • Ronen Palan, 2003. The offshore world : sovereign markets, virtual places, and nomad millionaires. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
  • Sol Picciotto, 1992. International business taxation : a study in the internationalization of business regulation. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.