The Colombia UK tax treaty: 80 years in the making

Hearson, M, 2017. The UK-Colombia Tax Treaty: 80 Years in the Making. British Tax Review (4):375-384.

Today at 2.30pm, the UK parliament’s Third Delegated Legislation Committee will debate tax treaties with Lesotho and Colombia. It will be interesting to see how much debate really takes place, a matter on which I’ve commented before once or twice.

The hearing gives me a chance to plug my article in the British Tax Review last year [pdf], which traced the UK’s attempts to obtain a tax treaty with Colombia over 80 years. Its overtures were frequently rejected, at first because Colombia was not interested in tax treaties, then because it was bound by the terms of the Andean pact, and finally because it could not agree on terms with the UK, especially over technical service fees, an area where the UK position has changed. Since the article was published I had the chance to speak with a Colombian tax official, who told me that Colombia’s change of heart on technical service fees is a change of view about tax policy, rather than a concession forced by OECD membership, as I speculated in the article. Of course, the two developments might not be totally independent.

Here is how the article concludes:

The demands of OECD membership, combined with the unusually liberal use of MFN clauses during an era of less-than-strategic negotiation, seem to have backed a country once insistent on a “red line” over technical service fees, and before that sceptical of accepting the limitations on its taxing rights that come with a tax treaty, into a corner. Having been constrained in its negotiating position by the pro-source taxation stance of the Andean community, Colombia now finds itself pulled in the other direction by the OECD. Is this further proof that the world is moving inexorably towards an OECD-type tax system? The gradual but steady expansion of the OECD, given a fillip most recently by the announcement that Brazil would begin accession talks, might lead us to such a conclusion. In contrast, however, the continued expansion in the use of the technical service fees Article by developing countries, together with its imminent introduction into the UN Model Treaty, point towards a growing divide between states on this topic.

The long history of negotiations between the UK and Colombia perhaps demonstrates more than anything the extent to which the tax treatment of international transactions today is a product of historically specific events. Each side’s positions changed radically over time, from a refusal to accept each other’s terms to a willingness to concede them outright. The UK’s constant enthusiasm for a treaty with Colombia stands in contrast with the latter’s oscillation between hot and cold. If Colombia turns cold again, however, it will be left with a fossilised relic of its negotiating position in 2016. Given the rarity with which tax treaties are terminated or their terms substantially renegotiated, treaty networks are collections of these fossils. Hence Colombia is stuck with its MFN [most favoured nation] clauses, regrettable outcomes of its negotiating spree in the 2000s. The biggest irony, however, is reserved for the UK. Despite its apparent willingness in the 2000s to forgo a treaty with Colombia over withholding taxes on technical service fees, Britain retains, as a legacy of its negotiations from 1973 until the turn of the century, the largest number of treaties of any OECD Member containing just such a clause

Who will chair the new UN tax committee?

As I write this post, the new UN tax committee is in closed session, choosing its new chair. This first act of the committee feels like it will have an important tone-setting impact. There is much speculation about who is the preferred candidate among members from OECD countries, and an assumption that those members will have arrived with a pre-agreed nominee. In contrast, while one name in particular among the members from developing countries is being mentioned in informal chat, there does not seem to be a consensus, a consequence perhaps of politics and of the fact that these members do not know each other so well. This dynamic is especially important, because the composition of the committee has changed, with members from the OECD now significantly outnumbered for the first time.

The last committee was finely balanced, with 12 members from OECD states and 13 from outside the OECD. Having said that, four more were G20 members, meaning that 16 of the committee came from countries that had seats at the high table of international tax rulemaking, while only nine were outside that particular tent. Looking at it by country income group, 13 were from high income countries, despite the UN tax committee’s developing country remit.


If we consider the members personally, eight of them were officers of an OECD tax committee, including the chair and vice-chair of Chair of OECD Working Party 1 on Tax Conventions and Related Questions, two bureau members of OECD Working Party No. 6 on the Taxation of Multinational Enterprises, and two bureau members of the OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs itself. Many of these eight were among the most vocal and active members, chairing the UN tax committee itself and several of its subcommittees.

This time around, I can count only eight members from OECD countries, and a clear majority of members from developing countries. There’s a caveat, however, which is that, as the OECD has invited more countries to participate in its Committee on Fiscal Affairs, a further seven members come from countries that are CFA participants or associates. There are now only five committee members who are officers on OECD committees, including both Vice-chairs of WP1 and two CFA bureau members. It’s a measure of how things are changing that one of these is from Argentina, which is not yet an OECD member. All of this means that, largely as before, only 10 of the 25 committee members come from countries that do not have a seat in the OECD and G20’s main tax discussions. Many of those ten, of course, are members of the Inclusive Framework and other OECD forums.Capturenew

So there is still some truth to the idea that the UN tax committee is essentially a forum in which many of the same people discuss many of the same topics, but with a different mandate and to some extent a different balance of power. For example, some UN committee members from OECD countries had reputations for actively supporting positions that differed from the OECD consensus, but were favoured by developing countries, in UN deliberations.

How ‘equal’ the ‘equal footing’ granted by the OECD is in practice is a question often raised. But it is also worth noting that at the UN committee, not all members have equal influence. Much of this variation is due to the personal capacity in which members attend. As a result, outcomes are a product of, among other things, their experience in international negotiations, how much of a mandate they have from the country that nominated them to adopt contentious positions, the strength of their informal relationships, their fluency in English, and how effectively they caucus in blocs. There is often a trade-off, for example, between seniority and technical knowledge.

This feels like a critical moment for international tax governance. The BRICS (or at least China and India) are becoming increasingly confident in articulating an autonomous position that diverges from that of the OECD, and many other developing countries are becoming more confident and experienced in international tax policy. The OECD’s offer of limited but significant participation to developing countries might be seen as a threat to the UN. But with a growing rift between the US and Europe on digital taxation, as well as between the OECD and emerging markets, a committee without US and UK membership for the next four years will have a different centre of gravity, and may therefore be more likely to carve a different path. If these terms still mean anything, the UN committee is now much closer to ‘source’ countries and further from ‘residence’ countries.

Update: The committee elected two co-chairs: Eric Mensah from Ghana and Carmel Peters from New Zealand.

Developing Countries’ Role in International Tax Cooperation

Developing Countries' Role in International Tax CooperationOver the past year I’ve worked with the secretariat of the Intergovernmental Group of 24* on a paper that discusses how developing countries could engage with a range of international tax cooperation issues. The paper can be downloaded here: Developing countries’ role in international tax cooperation [pdf].

The G-24 plays a caucusing role for its members in the IMF and World Bank, and so tax cooperation is becoming increasingly important for it as those organisations’ profile in tax work increases. There were some interesting presentations at the G-24’s last technical group meeting in February, and its most recent ministerial communique [pdf] includes the following statement, a mix of welcoming current initiatives and noting areas where they are insufficient for emerging markets and developing countries (‘EMDCs’):

We welcome ongoing initiatives on international tax cooperation such as the Automatic Exchange of Information (AEoI) initiative and the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), and call for a framework that ensures effective participation of EMDCs. We support the development of a digital global platform with least compliance cost for implementation of AEoI. We appreciate the work of the UN Tax Committee and encourage multilateral support to upgrade the Committee to an intergovernmental body to enhance the voice of EMDCs on international tax policy matters. We also call for more attention to developing fair tax rules to guide the taxation of multinational corporations and for international cooperation to prevent harmful international tax competition, negative spillovers from shifts in tax policies in major countries, and illicit financial flows.

One of the interesting elements of this project was the diverse positions and interests within an equally diverse group of ‘EMDCs’. Below, for example, is a table showing participation in international tax organisations and institutions. This was such a moving target that we had to set a ‘freeze date’ of 25th May 2017.

G-24 participation in international tax initiatives, May 2017

I hope the report provides a good overview of the state of play and issues involved on that date. Below is the text of the recommendations section, which gives a flavour of the document.

The G-24 has highlighted the importance of effective international tax cooperation to support developing countries’ efforts to mobilise domestic resources, so that they can achieve their development goals.  It could build on this recognition by setting out to develop a pro-active agenda for international tax rule reform that meets the needs of developing countries, and identify different international forums through which to achieve it. G-24 members could work together within existing forums such as the UN tax committee and OECD to put their issues of concern on the agenda. The UN tax committee’s potential has yet to be fully realised by developing countries, and there may also be new opportunities created by enhanced participation in OECD initiatives. G-24 members could strengthen their engagement by enhancing national political oversight of UN and OECD tax work, as well as advocating a stronger, upgraded UN tax committee when the opportunity next arises.

On tax avoidance and evasion, G-24 members could consolidate their participation in multilateral conventions on information exchange and mutual assistance, and could share their knowledge and experiences in this area to build each other’s capacity to benefit from their participation, as well as to identify reforms to international tax standards that might reduce the administrative hurdles to benefit.  Where necessary, this could lead to alternative, but compatible, standards in areas such as transfer pricing and tax treaties that give a greater share of the tax base to developing countries.

As some G-24 countries are capital-exporters to other developing countries, they could take up the IMF and OECD’s recommendation to perform ‘spillover analyses’ of the main aspects of their tax systems that have the potential to adversely affect other developing countries’ tax revenues, whether by encouraging tax competition or increasing incentives for tax avoidance. Also with regard to tax avoidance, G-24 members could share experiences across regional economic groupings such as ASEAN and MERCOSUR to advocate codes of conduct on tax competition, as well as working through ECOSOC for the adoption of the UN tax committee’s proposed code of conduct on exchange of tax information.

Above all, the G-24 provides a political platform for forging common views on international development issues among developing countries, in which tax coordination is a main concern.  It is able to work with the OECD within its inclusive framework, and a number of G-24 members are now participating in many of its initiatives. It can also support the efforts of the UN and other forums in which developing countries can more actively engage so that they can benefit more effectively from international tax rule reforms and cooperation.  A sustainable approach to international tax cooperation in the long term requires international institutions that reflect the increasingly diverse needs of countries with an interest in international tax standards.

*Just as there are 19 countries in the G-20, and 134 countries in the G-77, there are now 26-and-a-half countries in the G-24. The ‘half’ is China, which has the status of ‘special invitee’.

Three new publications

Summer in academia is a time for tidying up, so I have updated the page of this site with my publications. Here are three recently published items, with links to downloadable versions and their abstracts:

The Journal of Development Studies

The challenges for developing countries in international tax justice (link is to PDF of accepted version)

This is a review article to appear in the Journal of Development Studies, which was published online in May.

Developing countries face three main challenges in international tax cooperation. The most widely known is the twin problems of tax avoidance by foreign investors and tax evasion by domestic actors, which have become a major focus of debate in international organisations and of civil society activism in recent years. The second problem, tax competition, incorporates a range of issues from the ‘prisoners’ dilemma’ facing countries competing for inward direct investment through to the harmful tax rules used by tax havens that enable tax avoidance and evasion. This article reviews four recent monographs that analyse these problems at an international level. While they contain much useful discussion of the problems and potential technical solutions, there remains a need for political economy research to understand why certain technical solutions have not been adopted by governments. A third challenge faced by developing countries, barely considered in the tax and development literature up to now, leads to a note of caution: international tax institutions tend to be designed in ways that place disproportionate restrictions on capital-importing countries’ ability to tax foreign investors.

Studies in the History of Tax Law, volume 8

The UK’s tax treaties with developing countries during the 1970s (link is to PDF of accepted version)

This is a chapter in Studies in the History of Tax Law, volume 8, edited by Peter Harris and Dominic De Cogan. It’s been published today by Hart Publishing.

Tax treaties between developed and developing countries impose considerable costs on the latter, in the form of curbs on their right to tax investment from the former. Existing research assumes that such restrictions are accepted as a quid pro quo for resolving the problem of double taxation, which might act as an obstacle to inward investment. This paper uses archival documents to examine treaty negotiations between the United Kingdom (UK) and developing countries during the 1970s, focusing on contentious provisions concerning ‘tax sparing’, the taxation of shipping, and withholding taxes. Consistent with critical literature on tax treaties, it finds that neither side was concerned about the double taxation problem, which was resolved unilaterally by the UK’s tax credit. Rather, developing countries were primarily focused on obtaining matching tax credits in the UK to maximise the benefits to investors from their tax incentives. UK priorities, meanwhile, were to bind developing countries into OECD-type tax treatment of British firms. Negotiated outcomes did not reflect the true balance of costs and benefits to each side, but their different negotiating capacities, the political salience of particular taxes, and the precedent certain concessions might set for future negotiations.

WIDER working paper front coverWhat makes countries negotiate away their corporate tax base? (link is to published pdf)

This is a working paper for the United Nations University World Institute for Development.

Qualitative case studies suggest that the outcomes of tax treaty negotiations are determined by power politics and negotiating capability. In contrast, quantitative studies have tended to depart from a model that implies absolute gains, full rationality, and perfect information on the part of both treaty signatories. This paper bridges the gap by replicating two existing quantitative studies, introducing new, more sophisticated data. New fiscal data are drawn from the ICTD Government Revenue Dataset, while treaty content is measured using the ActionAid Tax Treaties Dataset. It finds that developing countries that raise more corporate income tax are more likely to sign tax treaties with wealthier countries, and more likely to negotiate higher withholding tax rates in those treaties, but not more likely to obtain a better negotiated result overall. In contrast, developing countries that raise more revenue in total are more likely to negotiate better outcomes in other clauses of the treaty that are more obscure and technically complex. There is also a strong learning effect, with better outcomes across the board as a developing country gains experience of signing tax treaties. Finally, greater asymmetries in investment stocks and material capabilities lead to worse outcomes for developing countries.

Certainty in the tax treaty regime

Here’s the text and slides of a talk I gave yesterday at an event called Harnessing the Commonwealth Advantage in International Trade.

I want to talk today about issues related to tax treaties in developing countries, and their impact on tax certainty for multinational investors. To do this I think we have to consider two aspects of the tax treaty regime: the multilateral norm-setting processes at the OECD and United Nations, and the individual bilateral treaties negotiated by pairs of countries. The key point I want to make is that, at both these levels, the elaboration of a regime that constrains developing countries’ source taxation rights in ways that risk being seen as excessive is not sustainable in the long term.

Consider first the multilateral level. Last week I was reading a PWC document, ‘Navigating the Maze: Impact of BEPS and Other International Tax Risks on the Jersey Funds Industry [pdf].’ It notes that:

Countries are already diverging from suggested guidance from the OECD, which was meant to bring coherence and consistency.

This does not only apply to developing countries, but there is plenty of evidence to suggest that in emerging markets there is a growing dissatisfaction with the OECD approach, as illustrated by the ongoing row over the status of the UN tax committee, and India’s recent financial contribution to its trust fund, which until then had been empty for over a decade.

Here are two quotes that illustrate this sentiment further:

“For developing countries the balance between source and residence taxation [is] very crucial. International tax rules with its preferences for residence based taxation [are] not in interest of developing countries.”

Eric Mensah, Ghana Revenue Authority, 2017 [pdf]

“The global tax system is stacked in favour of paying taxes in the headquarters countries of transnational companies, rather than in the countries where raw materials are produced.”

Francophone LIC Finance Ministers Network, 2014 [pdf]

It seems that, to maintain the integrity of the international tax system as emerging market voices become stronger, countries that favour residence-based taxation will need to accept greater flexibility within the instruments agreed at multilateral level.

Turning to the bilateral treaties that developing countries have negotiated, here I want to introduce you to some research I conducted at the LSE, funded by an NGO called ActionAid. ActionAid used it to inform a campaign that has targeted individual governments and treaties, calling for renegotiations.


I took 500 tax treaties concluded by developing countries and had a group of LLM students code them for the main clauses that could vary on a source-residence axis, using an International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation analysis. We can use that data to plot each treaty along a simple axis from 0 to 1, where 0 means an overwhelmingly residence-based treaty, and 1 a more source-based treaty. Remember that 1 here represents the presence of the most source-based clauses within existing treaties, and doesn’t take into account the concerns about inherent bias in the parameters for those treaties set by the OECD and UN models. In this first slide you can see that treaties among developing countries, in light blue, are becoming marginally more source-based over time, while treaties between developing countries and OECD members are becoming more residence-based.


The next chart shows some of the underlying drivers of those trends. You can see that permanent establishment definitions are becoming more expansive, perhaps reflecting changes to the model treaties, while withholding tax rates are trending downwards. There are diverse trends in different clauses within areas such as capital gains tax and taxation of services.

I want to talk to you about a few examples.


Here we see Vietnam’s treaties taken from the same dataset. Vietnam has actually expressed a comprehensive set of observations on the OECD model convention, broadly following the UN model. So here a zero on the vertical axis means the treaty contains none of those positions and instead follows the OECD model, while 1 means it includes all of Vietnam’s observations. You can see that in the 1990s Vietnam signed a number of more residence-based treaties that are completely the opposite of its stated negotiating position. And of course, these are with many of its biggest sources of investment.

More recently, Vietnam has come to regret those earlier treaties, and has chosen to interpret certain provisions on PE and technical services in the way it wished it had signed them, rather than the way it did. Businesses are very unhappy, and in the words of the Vietnam Business Forum, it has:

made the application of DTA[s] of foreign enterprises impossible, effectively it obliterate[s] the legitimate benefit of enterprises.

The residence-based treaties that Vietnam signed when it was inexperienced and urgently in need of investment are creating uncertainty, rather than the stability that investors are looking for.


You might be aware that a few years ago Mongolia tried to renegotiate a few of its treaties, and when it was unsuccessful it terminated them. They’re the treaties with the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Kuwait and the UEA, marked in black on here. But if you look on the bottom left, you see a number of treaties with OECD countries, including the UK and Germany, that have even more limited source taxing rights. Indeed, according to an IMF technical assistance report from 2012 [pdf]:

The Mongolian authorities are currently considering cancelling all DTAs and start building up a new DTA network with countries based on trade volumes and reciprocity in economic relations.

I’m told the IMF talked them out of this, but it is worth knowing that they considered it.


Here is Zambia, a Commonwealth example. You can see the same pattern. Its earlier treaties were very residence-based. I did some archival and interview work on those early treaties, and you can see that when they were first signed, Zambia had a hugely under-resourced civil service, with no experience of negotiation, and other countries took advantage of this. The most egregious example is its treaty with Ireland, which had zero withholding tax rates on all types of payment. That’s in contrast to the East African community countries, which had very strong negotiating red lines, and as a result either walked away, or obtained more source-based treaties that today appear quite generous, but have stood the test of time.


This chart shows a few renegotiations that have taken place in response to government and civil society concerns. You can see that Zambia’s renegotiations have focused more on updating treaties and closing loopholes, not dramatically shifting the balance of taxing rights. In contrast, Pakistan and Rwanda have both negotiated big overhauls.

So in conclusion, as the politicisation of the international tax regime continues, especially in developing countries, I think we’re likely to see growing demands for a rebalancing between source and residence not just in the multilateral setting, but also in individual treaties. My advice to OECD governments, and businesses who engage with them, is that tax certainty in the future depends on an enlightened approach to the tax treaty regime that leaves more developing country taxing rights intact.

European Economic and Social Council hearing on tax treaties and development

I’ve posted below the slides I just used for a presentation here at the European Economic and Social Council. The EESC has formed a study group to consider the question of “EU development partnerships and the challenge posed by international tax agreements.”

Interesting discussions included the evidence base for the effect of tax treaties on investment into developing countries. Here I think the key question is what provisions of tax treaties are relevant to investment flows, and in what circumstances, rather than simply whether tax treaties per se attract investment.

Tax certainty is the new buzzword, and it was interesting to think about how it applies here. On one hand, a treaty provides greater certainty because it commits its signatories to tax investors in a certain way as long as the treaty is in force. But that certainty relies on ongoing support for tax treaty norms. Developing countries feel unhappy with the content of the international tax norms on which bilateral treaties are based, as well as the institutions that develop those norms. (Here, for example, is a recent presentation by Eric Mensah from the Ghana Revenue Authority that makes these points). Countries such as Mongolia, Vietnam and Uganda are beginning to question the constraints imposed on their tax policy by treaties signed in the past. There is perhaps a trade-off between developed countries’ desire to defend the content of existing norms and the role of the OECD, and developing countries’ willingness to abide by those standards in the long term.

Link to presentation on Slideshare

Tax: an international political economy reading list

It’s been a while, but I’m back. One thing I did while the blog was silent was give a couple of lectures on tax and offshore, as part of broader courses I taught on international political economy and finance. In doing so I realised that the literature on international tax relations is not as sparse as it sometimes feels. Here is a selection of pieces that I included on my reading list for students. This should be a place to start if you’re a political scientist interested in learning about international tax, or from an economics or law background seeking different perspectives; if you’re from business, government or campaigning, see if these papers ring true to you. I have stuck strictly to publications in academic journals and academic books, but if you don’t have access to a university library, I’ve included links to any versions of the papers that are freely available.

This will be a living page, so please get in touch to point out anything I have missed, especially if you wrote it! The aim here is not to be comprehensive, but to provide an entry point. Apart from the law articles at the end, this is a disappointingly pale male list, and I hope over time to find some articles from a more diverse background!

Introductory articles

Gabriel Zucman, 2014. Taxing across Borders: Tracking Personal Wealth and Corporate Profits. Journal of Economic Perspectives 28(4): 121–148

The first piece on this list is actually by an economist. I like it because as well as bringing new data to the discussion about avoidance and evasion, it also explains the way the international tax system works pretty well and is a good entry level reading. I set it for my undergraduates in a general course on international political economy.

Thomas Rixen, 2011. From double tax avoidance to tax competition: Explaining the institutional trajectory of international tax governance. Review of International Political Economy 18(2): 197-227.

Rixen is probably the best known scholar writing on international tax in the rationalist, liberal institutionalist tradition, and this article encapsulates his powerful argument about path dependence in the development of the international tax regime: a system developed to tackle double taxation doesn’t have the institutional properties needed to handle harmful tax competition.

Jason Sharman, 2010. Offshore and the New International Political Economy. Review of International Political Economy 17(1): 1-19

This was a core reading for my postgraduate students, who enjoyed getting their teeth into it. The article sets out some of the main ways in which offshore is used in the global political economy – beyond just tax – organised around the concept of ‘calculated ambiguity’.

Ronen Palan, 1998. Trying to Have Your Cake and Eating It: How and Why the State System Has Created Offshore. International Studies Quarterly 2(4): 625–643

The oldest reading on the list, predating even the harmful tax practices project. It’s one of two articles by Ronen Palan that establish his concept of ‘commercialised sovereignty’, wrapping it up in an analysis of the political economy of the state under globalisation that helps explain why the state acts as it does. This was the other core reading for my postgraduates, because it explains the development of offshore within the evolution of the financial system more broadly.

Tax havens, coercion and information exchange

Lukas Hakelberg, 2016. Coercion in international tax cooperation: identifying the prerequisites for sanction threats by a great power. Review of International Political Economy 23(3): 511-541 

I came across Hakelberg’s work recently, and I think he does a great job of applying some classic rationalist international political economy theories to international tax. This article looks in particular at the nature of US financial hegemony in terms of internal and external factors, through the lens of the fight against tax havens.

Richard Eccleston and Richard Woodward, 2014. Pathologies in International Policy Transfer: The Case of the OECD Tax Transparency Initiative. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis 16(3): 216-229

OECD-bashing is a favourite hobby of international tax watchers, right through from NGO campaigners to the offshore industry. But those engaging in the practice rarely make their analysis of how the OECD works rigorous or explicit, whereas this paper tries to do so through the lens of bureaucratic politics.

Alex Cobham, Petr Janský and Markus Meinzer, 2015. The Financial Secrecy Index: Shedding new light on the geography of secrecy. Economic Geography 91(3): 281-303.

The financial secrecy index is a political intervention by Tax Justice Network, and as such it will always attract strong reactions. This is a peer-reviewed paper (the link is to a working paper version of the journal article) that sets it in context and explains the methodology. The discussion of defining ‘tax havens’ is essential background, and it would be a good exercise for students to review and critique the authors’ approach to developing the index.

Jason Sharman, 2012. Canaries in the Coal Mine: Tax Havens, the Decline of the West and the Rise of the Rest. New Political Economy, 17(4), pp.493-513

This is another good piece for students wanting to relate offshore to broader themes in international political economy. It divides offshore financial centres into five groups, and discusses how they have positioned themselves in the shifting terrain of the 21st century economy.

Michael C. Webb, 2004. Defining the Boundaries of Legitimate State Practice: Norms, Transnational Actors and the OECD’s Project on Harmful Tax Competition. Review of International Political Economy 11(4): 787-827

This article predates Jason Sharman’s definitive book on this topic. Its story, which considers the OECD as an organisation and the role played by particular interest groups, can very much be set in contrast to Lukas Hackelberg’s state-centred discussion.

Multinational corporate taxation

Leonard Seabrooke and Duncan Wigan, 2015. Powering ideas through expertise: professionals in global tax battles. Journal of European Public Policy 26(3): 357-374

In contrast to the rationalist, state-centred view of international tax bargaining employed by Rixen, Hackelberg and others, this article shifts focus to the role of professional expertise in propounding ideas. It also focuses on country-by-country reporting, which makes it one of the few articles so far to engage in depth with the campaigning around corporate tax avoidance.

Stephen Bell and Andrew Hindmoor, 2013. The Structural Power of Business and the Power of Ideas: The Strange Case of the Australian Mining Tax. New Political Economy 19(3): 470–486.

This paper questions whether the pressures created by tax competition are a real thing, arguing that it’s how much people believe capital will respond to tax competition that matters, not the extent to which it really will.

Philipp Genschel and Peter Schwarz, 2011. Tax competition: a literature review. Socio-economic Review 9(2): 339-370

I haven’t included a great deal of literature on tax competition in this list, because that’s a more familiar evidence base, but this is a great review that considers the political science and economics literature, as it was in 2011 at least.

Roland Paris, 2003. The Globalization of Taxation? Electronic Commerce and the Transformation of the State. International Studies Quarterly 47(2): 153–182

An old article that came to my attention when a student dug it out in an essay. Like Palan’s piece, also in ISQ, this paper draws out implications for the state from the challenges of globalisation and international taxation. It also has the merit that we can compare its speculation against what has happened since 2003.

Legal scholarship that crosses into international relations

Sol Picciotto, 2015. Indeterminacy, Complexity, Technocracy and the Reform of International Corporate Taxation. Social and Legal Studies 24(2): 165–184.

This article takes a Bourdieusian perspective on the relationship between power and expertise, providing a fresh view of the politics of international corporate tax. It makes a careful, compelling argument that can be read in parallel with Seabrooke and Wigan’s paper above.

Itai Grinberg, 2015. Breaking BEPS: The New International Tax Diplomacy. Georgetown law working paper.

Grinberg, like Lukas Hackelberg, is doing interesting work drawing analogies across from other, more intensively studied areas of international financial law, in particular the Basel process. This working paper is a great summary of where a research agenda based on this analogy might go.

Allison Christians, 2012. How Nations Share. Indiana Law Journal 87(4): 1407-1452.

This is my go-to piece analysing the trajectory of legalisation and judicialisation in international tax disputes. While work on the division of the tax base in international relations has tended to be preoccupied by the conclusion of tax treaties, this is one of the few pieces to examine how they are applied and used in practice.

Diane Ring, 2010. Who is Making International Tax Policy? International Organizations as Power Players in a High Stakes World. Fordham International Law Journal 33(3): 649-722

Diane Ring is probably the lawyer who has gone furthest into international relations literature. She uses it here to discuss institutional arrangements for international tax cooperation, focusing on the different actors involved and how they engage with each other.

Eduardo Baistrocchi, 2008. The Use and Interpretation of Tax Treaties in the Emerging World: Theory and Implications. British Tax Review 28(4):352-390.

Love it or hate it, game theory is a big part of international relations. These last two articles are good examples of legal scholars using it in their own work to examine the relationship between developed and developing countries in the international tax regime. This paper analyses how the structural characteristics of the international tax system shape incentives for developing countries to conclude and apply tax treaties.

Tsilly Dagan, 2000. The Tax Treaties Myth. New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 32:939-1175

This article has a kind of totemic status within the critical legal literature on tax treaties, and it’s the starting point for much of my own work. It all comes down to a bit of game theory that would not be out of place in an international relations article, which questions the prevailing logic behind tax treaties. While Baistrocchi, above, focuses on the system level, this paper concentrates on the bilateral relationship a developed and developing country.

Books and journal special issues

  • Revenue Mobilization in the Developing World: Changes, Challenges and Chances. 2016. Review of International Political Economy, 23(2).
  • Peter Dietsch, and Thomas Rixen (eds), 2016. Global Tax Governance : What is wrong with it and how to fix it. Colchester: ECPR Press.
  • Tasha Fairfield, 2015. Private wealth and public revenue in Latin America : business power and tax politics. New York: Cambridge University Press.
  • Jeremy Leaman and Attiya Waris, 2013. Tax Justice and the Political Economy of Global Capitalism, 1945 to the Present. New York: Berghahn
  • Ronen Palan, Richard Murphy and Christian Chavagneux, 2013. Tax havens: How globalization really works. Cornell University Press.
  • Richard Eccleston, 2012. The Dynamics of Global Economic Governance: The OECD, the Financial Crisis and the Politics of International Tax Cooperation. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
  • Thomas Rixen, 2008. The political economy of international tax governance. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
  • Reuven Avi-Yonah, 2007. International Tax as International Law. New York: Cambridge University Press.
  • Jason Sharman, 2006. Havens in a Storm: The Global Struggle for Tax Regulation. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
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